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ABSTRACT
We posit that potentially compromised credentials are detectable by analyzing the system
artifacts of a large-scale production, single-signon system. With permission from the De-
fense Manpower Data Center, we analyze a year’s worth of system artifacts produced by
the Department of Defense Self-Service Logon system. Using industry standard tools and
descriptive statistics we develop a repeatable process that identifies potentially compro-
mised credentials. We look for characteristics that coincide with compromised credentials
and evaluate our approach by obtaining the ground truth on several of the credentials we
identify.
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Executive Summary
The Department of Defense (DOD) Self Service Logon (DSL) is a large-scale single-signon
system, that issues username and password based credentials that adhere to the standards
established in the National Institute of Standards and Technology Electronic Authentication
Guidelines Special Publication 800-63-2 [1]. The DSL was established in 2008 by Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in support of the DOD Personnel Identity Protection Pro-
gram [2], and is meant to be a cost effective solution for securing access to applications
across the ecosystem.
To date, there are roughly 3.5 million DSL credentials in circulation, securing around 20
different DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs applications. The system on a whole
supports between 3 and 4 million authentications per month. Today, the DSL secures appli-
cations that manage data consisting of medical records, benefit applications, and banking
information for active duty soldiers, family members, retirees, and veterans.
As usage of the credential grows, the potential for abuse against the DSL grows more attrac-
tive. For instance, automated systems, or even criminal enterprises, may seek access to the
data protected by the credential. Thus, mechanisms to identify compromised credentials
are increasingly important.
With permission from DMDC, and access to the DSL system artifacts, the goal of this
thesis is to retrospectively inspect event patterns appearing in the DSL logs in order to
detect potentially compromised credentials. Detecting these credentials is a step toward
securing the DSL credential system and provides credential owners confidence that their
personally identifiable information is secure. To achieve this goal, this thesis shall develop
a set of procedures that leverage statistical analysis and industry standard tools to parse,
store, index, and analyze the artifacts generated by the DSL system.
List of References
[1] W. E. Burr et al.. (2013). Electronic authentication guideline. [Online]. Available:
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-2.pdf.
[2] Department of Defense. (2004). Department of Defense personnel identity program.
[Online]. Available: http://www.cac.mil/docs/DoDD-1000.25.pdf.
xv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
xvi
Acknowledgements
Defense Manpower Data Center 400 Gigling Rd Seaside, CA 93955
xvii




From the moment a service member enlists in the military to the time of their passing, both
the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) guarantee a
variety of benefits for them and their family members. Benefits such as healthcare, housing,
and continued education, are just a few of the rewards provided for their hardships.
These benefits are managed and maintained through a series of information technology (IT)
systems that are susceptible to security vulnerabilities like any other modern day infrastruc-
ture. Criminal enterprises and individual scam artists look to capitalize on these vulnerabil-
ities, for instance by attempting to falsely claim benefits for themselves. One of the main
IT systems protecting these applications is the DOD Self Service Logon (DSL).
The DSL is a large-scale single-signon system, that issues username and password based
credentials that adhere to the standards established in the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Electronic Authentication Guidelines special publication (SP) 800-63-
2 [2]. It is used by individuals associated with the DOD and / or the DVA, such as active
duty soldiers, family members, retirees and veterans, to access a wide range of self-service
applications. On November 8 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness issued a memorandum requiring “All newly accessed Active Duty and National
Guard and Reserve members in possession of a Common Access Card (CAC), shall be
directed to obtain a DSL” [3]. Consequently, to date there are roughly 3.5 million DSL
credentials in circulation, that are used to authenticate individuals to approximately 20
different applications. On a whole, the system supports between 3 and 4 million authenti-
cations per month and these numbers have consistently grown year after year. As shown in
Figure 1, which we generate from internal Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) data,
we can reasonably expect the growth of the system to continue in the near future making
the need for this thesis more and more important.
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Figure 1.1: Growth of the DS Logon Credential
1.1 Background
Benefits that exist today within the DOD and DVA were created over time through various
acts of the United States (U.S.) Congress. For example, the Dependents Medical Care Act
of 1956 [4] and the Military Medical Benefits Amendments of 1966 [5] created programs
that eventually became the military health system that exists today.
When a new benefit comes into existence a mechanism is needed that provides beneficia-
ries the ability to apply for and obtain that benefit. Often the DOD and DVA pursued a
strategy to build a new IT system for each benefit. Over time this resulted in a patchwork
of IT systems, that do not adhere to a cohesive architecture. As a result, each system im-
plemented their own credentialing and authentication mechanism requiring beneficiaries to
maintain countless usernames and passwords. To solve this problem both the DOD and
DVA quickly recognized the need to implement a centralized credentialing and authentica-
tion mechanism to ease this burden and support these various systems.
In July, 2004, the DOD issued directive 1000.25 titled “DOD Personnel Identity Protec-
tion (PIP) Program” [6]. This program consolidated several identity programs from within
the department, and centralized the capability to store authoritative identity information
and issue DOD identity credentials. As outlined by this directive, the Defense Enroll-
ment and Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) repository became the authoritative source
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for identity information used by the Real-time Automated Personnel Identification Sys-
tem (RAPIDS) to issue CACs to all DOD personnel, including military members, civilians,
and contractors.
The CAC standard, later formalized by NIST in Federal Information Processing Stan-
dards (FIPS) 201 [7] and mandated across the entire federal government with Homeland
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 [8], was an ideal solution for the authentication
and authorization of DOD personnel to both physical and virtual DOD assets. Physical
assets, such as base access and commissary privileges, and virtual assets, such as classified
and non-classified networks, all became secured by the CAC infrastructure.
For authentication purposes, the CAC is considered a NIST level four credential, refer-
ring to the credential levels of assurance established in the NIST standards document SP
800-63-2. As shown in Table 1.1, there are four standardized NIST credential levels of
assurance. This standard states, “Level 4 authentication is based on proof of possession
of a key through a cryptographic protocol. At this level, in-person identity proofing is re-
quired” [2]. In terms of the DOD, this means that, in order to obtain a CAC, a person must
prove his or her identity in-person at a RAPIDS station.
Table 1.1: NIST Credential Levels of Assurance, after [2].
Assurance Level Description
1
Although there is no identity proofing requirement at this
level, the authentication mechanism provides some assur-
ance that the same Claimant who participated in previous
transactions is accessing the protected transaction or data.
2
Provides single factor remote network authentication. At
Level 2, identity proofing requirements are introduced, re-
quiring presentation of identifying materials or information.
A wide range of available authentication technologies can
be employed at Level 2
3
3Provides multi-factor remote network authentication. At
least two authentication factors are required. At this level,
identity proofing procedures require verification of identi-
fying materials and information. Level 3 authentication is
based on proof of possession of the allowed types of tokens
through a cryptographic protocol.
4
Is intended to provide the highest practical remote network
authentication assurance. Level 4 authentication is based on
proof of possession of a key through a cryptographic proto-
col. At this level, in-person identity proofing is required.
While the CAC is ideal, and cryptographically secure for authentication purposes, the DOD
realized not all of their assets required the same level of security provided by the CAC.
They also realized it was cost prohibitive to issue CACs to family member, retiree, and vet-
eran populations when those populations require access to lower-value assets. Therefore,
the DOD needed an alternative to the CAC that was both secure and low cost.
In 2008, the DOD with support from DMDC, developed the DSL credential to be a NIST
level two credential used for authentication purposes on self-service applications. Self-
service applications are defined as, applications where a user manages their own informa-
tion. For example, applications where users register for benefits, check the status of a med-
ical claim, or update their contact information are all considered self-service. While self-
service applications by definition do not maintain classified information, they can maintain
sensitive beneficiary data (e.g., bank account numbers or medical history, such as Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) status). Therefore, the DSL credential strictly adheres to
security and identity proofing standards to ensure personally identifiable information (PII)
remains protected and accessible only to the rightful owner. Had these standards not been




Due to the fact that the DSL system is a centralized credentialing and authentication single-
signon system, if a credential is compromised all applications accepting a DSL are accessi-
ble. Consequently, as more and more applications throughout the DOD ecosystem migrate
in support of the credential as shown in Appendix C, and with its continued growth as seen
in Figure 1, the need to validate the credential’s security has never been greater. There-
fore, the security objective of this thesis is to help ensure our soldiers’ hard earned benefits
remain their hard earned benefits.
With permission from DMDC, and access to the DSL system artifacts, the goal of this
thesis is to retrospectively inspect event patterns appearing in the DSL logs in order to
detect potentially compromised credentials. Detecting these credentials is a step toward
securing the DSL credential system and provides credential owners confidence that their
PII is secure. To achieve this goal, this thesis shall develop a set of procedures that leverage
statistical analysis and industry standard tools to parse, store, index and analyze the artifacts
generated by the DSL system.
1.3 Contributions and Benefits
This thesis makes the following primary contributions, which we hope DMDC will leverage
to enhance the security of the DSL system:
1. Identified 84,712 Previously Unknown Potentially Compromised Credentials
As analyzed in Chapter 5, this thesis has flagged 84,712 potentially compromised
credentials. These credentials were previously unknown to be suspect.
2. Identify DSL Security Vulnerabilities
The results of this thesis help identify how the system is being exploited and shall
lead to additional security measures to prevent future attacks (see §3.1.1).
3. Establish Procedures for Handling Compromised Credentials
The results of this thesis shall lead to the development of standard operating proce-
dures (SOPs) to follow after a credential is flagged as compromised. Steps such as,
locking a credential, rolling back data modifications and potentially contacting the
individual may all be part of the newly created procedures.
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The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 discusses related work and the tools used to complete the analysis.
• Chapter 3 speaks to the artifacts provided by DMDC and any shortcomings that may
exist within those artifacts.
• Chapter 4 reviews the steps required to process the artifacts provided and outlines a
strategy used to identify potentially compromised credentials.
• Chapter 5 examines the results of the analysis conducted and determines if compro-
mised credentials may exist.
• Chapter 6 explores the ground truth of credentials previously identified as potentially
compromised.
• Chapter 7 summarizes the results, discusses future work.
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CHAPTER 2:
Related Work and Tools
The work related to the identification of compromised credentials is found in three areas
(i) big data and data visualization, (ii) automated network traffic and (iii) attack vectors of
a single-signon system.
2.1 Big Data and Data Visualization
Data mining large datasets consisting of both structured and unstructured data has been a
problem in the technology industry for a number of years. In the realm of unstructured
data, Carlo Strozzi first used the term “No Structured Query Language (NoSQL)” in 1998
to “name his lightweight, open-source relational database that did not expose the standard
Structured Query Language (SQL) interface” [9]. Over the years, the meaning of the term
NoSQL has morphed to represent a classification of data storage systems that do not store
data in a structured Relational Database Management System (RDBMS) but rather in a
schema-free repository that is designed to simplify the storage and retrieval process.
The popularity of NoSQL repositories is mainly due to the fact that they address the data
storage scalability problem while still maintaining performance by leveraging parallel pro-
cessing. “NoSQL data stores will not be a “passing fad”. The simplicity, flexibility, and
scalability of these systems fills a market niche, (e.g., for web sites with millions of read-
/write users and relatively simple data schemas)” [10].
The evolution of NoSQL repositories has lead to the need for tools, such as Splunk [11] and
Elasticsearch [12], to replace the search capabilities previously provided by SQL queries.
Elasticsearch, for example, provides the ability to perform full text searches on large,
schema-free, unstructured repositories and provides key data visualization as needed.
In the work “Bridging the Gaps: Joining Information Sources with Splunk,” Stearley et
al. discuss the concept of indexing vast amounts of system log artifacts produced by the
Red Sky supercomputer located at the Sandia National Laboratories [13]. They are able to
identify critical issues within the supercomputer in almost real-time and produce statisti-
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cally relevant graphs. This approach is not novel, but does provide a significant contribution
in the development of our strategy on how to index the DSL artifacts provided by DMDC
and potentially find compromised credentials.
Another key component of our strategy to finding compromised credentials is recognizing
the artifacts provided by DMDC allow for time series analysis and the leveraging of data
visualization techniques. “The aim of time series analysis is to obtain insight into phe-
nomena, to discover repetitive patterns and trends, and to predict the future” [14]. A key
contribution discussed in the work, “Strategies for the visualization of geographic time-
series data” [15] is that a graphic can quickly be overloaded with labels and symbols and
clustering strategies are needed to alleviate this issue. We leverage this insight in the initial
phase of our analysis when searching for events from malicious countries (see Characteris-
tic 4.2.1).
2.2 Automated Network Traffic
The strategies discussed in the works “Detecting Stealthy, Distributed SSH Brute-Forcing” [16]
and “Classification of Automated Web Traffic” [17] provide concrete solutions on how best
to identify automated traffic and ultimately compromised credentials. Javed and Paxson use
descriptive statistics to establish a realistic threshold on the number of failed authentication
attempts an average user may create within an hour when attempting to authenticate via
Secure Shell (SSH) to a host. Using this threshold, they are able to identify system outliers
by generating several Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDFs) from data stored within
a host’s syslogs. A critical component of their work relied on the ability to refine their
threshold values by using a correlation data set. Their correlation data set consisted of
known credentials attempting to brute-force the SSH system. Unfortunately, a correlation
data set is not available in the case of the DSL, however, this approach is still valid and one
that is heavily leveraged throughout this thesis.
While Javed and Paxson [16] used failed authentication attempts as one characteristic to de-
tect brute-force attacks, the DSL has the opportunity to use several characteristics. Buehrer,
Stokes, Chellapilla, and Platt identify several by looking at the different features of auto-
mated web traffic within the context of a search engine [17]. While the problem they are
trying to solve is different than ours, the characteristics they use are applicable to this re-
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search such as, “Number of Internet Protocols (IPs) / location,” “Reputation,” and “Request
Time Periodicity.” All of which shall be explored in depth throughout this thesis.
Other works such as, “Automated Traffic Classification and Application Identification us-
ing Machine Learning” [18] attempt to classify automated network traffic by examining
packet features. These features are examined with an unsupervised machine learning based
system. While this is an effective approach as they are able to achieve an average accuracy
of 86.5 percent [18]. Unfortunately, the required data to accomplish this technique is not
available for our research. The artifacts provided by DMDC only supply the source IP for
each event.
2.3 Attack Vectors of a Single-Signon System
Systems similar to the DSL have been developed by other organizations to maintain cus-
tomer loyalty and simplify the authentication process for application providers. Several
popular implementations are listed below.
• Single Sign-On with SAML on Force.com [19]
• SAML Single Sign-On (SSO) Service for Google Apps [20]
• Facebook Login [21]
• Claims-Based Single Sign-On for the Web and Windows Azure [22]
Most of these systems, however, authenticate NIST level one (see Table 1.1) credentials for
any application provider. Where as the DSL system is a closed system authenticating NIST
level two credentials for known application providers. While these systems differ they do
share the same risks and attack vectors. Understanding the known attack vectors of these
systems as discussed in the work “Risks of the passport single sign-on protocol” [23] is
critical to identifying characteristics of compromised credentials. For example, Kormann’s
description of an active attack, where an attacker acts as a proxy between the authentication
system and the client, validated the decision to include the “Events from an IP that has a
Poor Reputation” characteristic described in 4.2.1.
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2.4 Tools
The related work discussed above starting with §2.1 provides foundation that which this
thesis can build a strategy on how to identify potentially compromised credentials. To
implement that strategy and develop a mechanism that is sustainable by DMDC a set of
stable, robust tools are needed. While the following are not business requirements from
DMDC adhering to these requirements when selecting tools shall make it easier for DMDC
to continue this effort.
1. Zero Licensing Costs
2. Open Source
3. Ease of Deployment
4. Scalable
5. Large Support Community
6. Extensive Documentation
After performing a careful survey on the state of the art, three products were identified
as potential candidates to support this thesis, Elasticsearch [12], Apache Solr [24] and
Splunk [11]. While Splunk is a feature rich solution it can be immediately eliminated
from the list due to the fact that it is a commercial closed source product. Even though,
Elasticsearch and Apache Solr are similar, Elasticsearch has an extensive user community
and documentation. Therefore, we use Elasticsearch for this thesis.
2.4.1 Elasticsearch
The Elasticsearch website defines their product as “A flexible and powerful open source
real-time search analytics engine. Architected from the ground up for use in distributed
environments where reliability and scalability are must haves, Elasticsearch gives you the
ability easily to move beyond simple full-text search” [25]. In fact Elasticsearch is built
on top of the Apache Lucene project which itself is a very mature open source Java based
indexing and search technology. Elasticsearch is easily scalable by simply adding more
machines and is extensible with a wide variety of company and community supported plu-
gins that facilitate an ever growing list of uses for the tool. This thesis shall leverage
Elasticsearch as its main indexing and search technology for all data.
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Kibana
Data indexed and stored in Elasticsearch is searchable through an extensive Representa-
tional State Transfer (REST) Application Programming Interface (API) [26]; however, this
interface makes visualizing valuable information challenging. To provide visualization,
Elasticsearch built and maintains a plugin named “Kibana” to quickly and easily visualize
data indexed with Elasticsearch. As described by Elasticsearch, “Kibana is Elasticsearch’s
data visualization engine, allowing you to natively interact with all your data in Elastic-
search via custom dashboards” [25]. Kibana is a web-based, javascript engine that allows
for the filtering and visualization of data stored in Elasticsearch in many different formats
e.g., maps depicting the geo-location or histograms for a time series. This thesis shall
use Kibana to develop a series of dashboards intended to quickly identify compromised
credentials.
2.4.2 MaxMind GeoLite
Every event within the artifacts provided by DMDC contains a source IP address. While
IP addresses are only Internet identifiers, they can often be traced to a physical location in
the real world. In fact there are several services that exist to perform this functionality.
The MaxMind Geo Lite service [27] is a free geo-location service that is used to find the
physical location of an IP address. This thesis shall use the MaxMind GeoLite Java based
API to identify the geo-location of every routable event within the artifacts provided by
DMDC. This information is vital to being able to identify suspicious events and ultimately
compromised credentials.
2.4.3 Spamhaus Zen
Along with a geo-location, every IP address has what is referred to as a reputation. IP rep-
utations are generally maintained to assist network and system administrators in separating
legitimate from illegitimate network traffic. While there are several commercial services
that provide IP reputations, as with most things on the Internet free to use with community
support is most often the best choice.
The Spamhaus Project, “Is an international nonprofit organization whose mis-
sion is to track the Internet’s spam operations and sources, to provide depend-
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able realtime anti-spam protection for Internet networks, to work with Law
Enforcement Agencies to identify and pursue spam and malware gangs world-
wide, and to lobby governments for effective anti-spam legislation.” [28]
This thesis shall use the Spamhaus Zen Domain Name System (DNS) Block List (DNSBL)
service [29] to obtain the IP reputation for every event. As shown in Table 2.1 the Zen
service has four categories of responses, Unsolicited, Snowshoe, Trap, and Policy. To
ensure all events are assigned a reputation, good or bad, this thesis shall also assign two
additional reputations, Allowlist, and Private. Accurate reputation information is vital in
being able to identify suspicious events and corresponding compromised credentials.
Table 2.1: Spamhaus Zen Return Codes and Reputation
Types
Type Return Codes Description
Unsolicited 127.0.0.2
Direct Unsolicited Bulk Email (UBE) sources,
spam operations and spam services.
Snowshoe 127.0.0.3
Direct snowshoe spam sources detected via au-
tomation. “Snowshoe spamming is a technique
used by spammers to spread spam output across
many IPs and domains, in order to dilute repu-
tation metrics and evade filters” [30].
Trap 127.0.0.4-7
The Composite Blocking List (CBL) is a list
of suspected E-mail spam sending computer in-
fections. The Composite Blocking List (CBL)
takes its source data from very large spamtrap-
s/mail infrastructures, and only lists IPs exhibit-
ing characteristics such as, open proxies, worm-
s/viruses/botnets , or are otherwise participating




The Spamhaus Policy Block List (PBL) is a
DNSBL database of end-user IP address ranges
which should not be delivering unauthenticated
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) email to
any Internet mail server except those provided
for specifically by an Internet Service Provider
(ISP) for that customer’s use.
Allowlist NONE IP does not appear on any block list.
Private NONE
Refer to Request For Comment (RFC) 1918
10/8 prefix, 172.16/12 prefix, 192.168/16 pre-
fix
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In many large organizations, the management of artifacts produced by its systems is a com-
plex and challenging task. One that requires a deep understanding of data warehousing
strategies in order to support the storage and recall of the artifacts. These artifacts often
include structured data such as databases, eXtensible Markup Language (XML) and un-
structured data such as system and application log files. This data can provide valuable
information about an organization if strategies are available to process large quantities of
information.
The DSL system is one of many systems developed and hosted by DMDC that produces all
types of system artifacts. Within these artifacts lie key information about how and when a
DSL credential is used. The main artifacts analyzed by this thesis are the DSL event logs.
The event data is considered structured data and is currently stored in an Oracle RDBMS.
3.1 Events
When the DSL system was architected the auditing of a credential’s usage was a first-order
requirement – at all times it should be possible to produce a complete list of when, where,
and how a credential is used. The result of this requirement was the event model, an API
that is used throughout the system to capture and store “events” as they occur. The model
is extensible so that over time, as new features are developed, new types of “events” can be
recorded and audited. Please refer to Appendix A to see a complete listing of all the types
of events captured by the system.
For the purposes of detecting compromised DSL credentials, this thesis shall examine event
data from January 2013 to January 2014. The data provided by DMDC resulted in 51
artifacts each roughly 1GB in size and containing 1 million events. The artifacts were
produced using Oracle’s Data Pump Export Utility [31].
Each line in any one artifact represents a single event, that occurred within the system. In
order to trace events back to a credential, each event is associated with exactly one profile.
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As shown in Figure 3.1, a profile has a one-to-one relationship with a person registered in
the DEERS repository and has exactly one DSL credential. Therefore, in order to have a












Events are of a 
particular Event Type
Figure 3.1: Entity Relationship Model
Understanding these relationships is critical to being able to discover compromised creden-
tials as discussed in the analysis phase of this thesis (see Chapter 5).
3.1.1 Shortcomings
While extensive, the DSL event data has several shortcomings that are the direct result of
policy and/or design decisions made by DMDC. As consumers of the data these shortcom-
ings cannot be overcome at the time of our analysis.
The first shortcoming, is based on the fact that every event is tied to a profile. This means,
before an event is saved, a user must first identify themselves. Users typically achieve this
by supplying either PII (e.g., first and last name, date of birth, and social security number
etc.) or a pre-registered DSL credential. Only when this information is provided, can
the DSL system associate a user’s traffic with a specific profile and create relevant events.
Therefore, should an automated system attempt to compromise a credential by probing
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the system with failed authentication attempts, this traffic is not recorded and cannot be
detected or identified by our analysis because, the user was never properly identified.
The second shortcoming, is due to the fact that a subset of events contain IP addresses
from the set of IPs defined in RFC 1918 [32]. Out of the 50,466,578 events provided by
DMDC 6,709,884 or roughly 13.3 percent contain a RFC 1918 address. Prior to the event
API going live in March 2012, all IP tracking and blocking was handled at the edge of the
network and as a result no source IP data was transmitted internally. Consequently, until
this issue was resolved by DMDC in March of 2013 all events tracked internal IP addresses.
While this subset is small it does prevent us from capturing the geo-location of all events
within the artifacts provided.
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Identifying patterns or specific data points when dealing with large amounts of data, struc-
tured or unstructured, is technically challenging. Even assuming sufficient physical ar-
chitecture (e.g., storage, processing power, and memory) is already established to handle
the vast amount of data, many challenges still exist. Items of interest are often obscured
simply because there is too much data or too many complexities exist within the data to
comprehend the relationships of how it all ties together.
Fortunately, many companies and organizations alike have developed strategies and tools
to parse, store, index, and analyze massive amounts of data. By leveraging parallel process-
ing and distributed computing strategies, the speed of analysis can scale sub-linearly with
respect to the amount of data. These strategies have enabled organizations to make better
decisions and be more efficient. We leverage these same strategies and tools to find those
characteristics that are suggestive of compromised or otherwise anomalous credentials.
Our methodology includes a process to efficiently parse, store and index the artifacts pro-
vided by DMDC. Then we devise a set of characteristics that best describe compromised
credentials and analyze the data to look for those characteristics. Based on combinations of
characteristics that are outside of the norm, we identify potentially compromised creden-
tials.
4.1 Process
A first and critical step of the process is to ensure the security of the artifacts provided
by DMDC. Due to the sensitive nature of the artifacts and the fact that they contain PII
(e.g., IP addresses), all data must be secured at all times, including when at rest. Therefore,
we store and maintain the data on an isolated encrypted disk partition with access granted
only on a need-to-know basis. Once we establish the encrypted partition, the installation of
Elasticsearch and Kibana can begin.
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4.1.1 Setup
The setup of the tools described in §2.4 is a relatively straight-forward process, which we
accomplish with system administrator rights. Our analysis only requires a basic installation
of the tools because, features such as, high availability are not necessary. A complete listing
of all commands and configuration modifications needed to install the tools are listed in
Appendix B.
4.1.2 Indexing
Upon completing the setup process, the indexing of the artifact data can commence. The
strategy behind the process outlined below is based on a key understanding that Elastic-
search is an indexing and search engine that also stores JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)
documents for fast retrieval. It is not designed to act like a typical RDBMS or NoSQL
repository that balances resources between searches and modifications of existing records
(e.g., INSERT and UPDATE). Therefore, the general strategy is to perform all modifica-
tions to event records prior to indexing in Elasticsearch, including all geo-location and IP
reputation analysis. Our goal is that once the indexing is complete the analysis process























Figure 4.1: Indexing Process
As shown in Figure 4.1.2, there are six steps involved in our indexing process. Those steps
are:
1. Extract Profiles and IP Addresses
As discussed in §3.1 DMDC provided 51 artifacts each containing roughly 1 mil-
lion events. For example, the following is a sample event (Note: White space has
been removed to enhance readability and some values have been changed to ensure
anonymity.)
123456 33280374201301010000001490000 7127.0.0.1 IDM
When parsed, we get a profile id of 123456 and an IP address of 127.0.0.1. Af-
ter parsing roughly 50 million events we combine the results to produce two files,
21
“profile.distinct” and “ip.distinct”, both of which are used in subsequent steps.
2. Geo Locate IP Addresses
In order to obtain an IP address’s geo-location in a efficient manner using the Max-
Mind Geo Lite service (see §2.4.2), the “ip.distinct” file produced in step one is
broken down into several smaller files. Then using the MaxMind Geo Lite API we
process each file and obtain a geo-location for each IP. The result of this step is a
“geo.distinct” file that contains a list of comma delimited strings in the following
format, “IP,LONGITUDE,LATITUDE”.
3. Obtain Reputation of IP Addresses
Using a similar process to the previous step, the “ip.distinct” file is once again bro-
ken down into several smaller files. This time, however, the reputation of each IP
is obtained using the the Spamhaus Zen service (see §2.4.3). This step produces
a “rep.distinct” file that contains a list of comma delimited strings in the format,
“IP,REPUTATION+”.
4. Index Profiles
To store additional information about each profile (e.g., compromised characteristic
see §4.2.1), we maintain the parent child relationship in Elasticsearch between the
profile and the event data. Each profile is stored and indexed separate from the event
data in the Elasticsearch repository by parsing the “profile.distinct” file and using the
Elasticsearch Bulk API [33].
5. Index Events
Similar to the previous step we store and index each of the roughly 50 million events
using the Elasticsearch Bulk API [33]. The difference between this step and the
previous one, is that prior to storing and indexing each event, we populate them with
their corresponding geo-location and reputations previously identified in steps two
and three.
6. Validate Profiles and Events
The final step in the process is to validate that the previous steps accurately accounted
for all profiles and events before the analysis can begin. We achieve this by obtain-
ing a count from the “profile.distinct” file generated in step one and the 51 artifacts
provided by DMDC. The “profile.distinct” file contains 3,687,780 profiles and each
of the 51 artifacts except for one contained 1,000,000 events for a total of 50,466,578
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events. Then by using the Elasticsearch Count API [34], we query the repository to
validate these numbers match. Listing 4.1 shows the exact validation queries used to
prove all profiles and events are properly indexed.










The strategy of this thesis is to develop a list of characteristics that best describe a po-
tentially compromised credential. Then, using the tools described above and descriptive
statistics, such as CDFs, produce the set of credentials ordered by their likelihood of hav-
ing been compromised. Finally, select a few of the identified credentials and attempt to
find the “ground truth” by contacting the individuals via established channels such as the
DMDC call center to determine if the credentials are truly compromised (see Chapter 6).
4.2.1 Characteristics of a Compromised Credential
Today, the DSL secures applications that manage data consisting of medical records, bene-
fit applications and banking information for active duty soldiers, family members, retirees
and veterans. In general, the accepting applications are designed to support human re-
sources (HR) activities and the management of DOD or DVA benefits (see Appendix C
for a complete list of the applications accepting a DSL). With these types of applications,
one might expect that the typical user authenticates a couple of times per month to manage
their benefits. In contrast, a profile with significantly more authentications is suggestive of
a credential that is being abused. Naturally, a single characteristic is insufficient to accu-
rately ascertain abuse. Therefore, we seek to assemble the multiple characteristics into a
aggregate picture of the profile. The complete list characteristics are designed to identify
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credentials that drastically exceed (fall within the top 0.5 percentile), their realistic esti-
mates and are considered potentially compromised. The following is the complete list of
characteristics we intend to examine.
Excessive Number of Events
Any credential with an excessive number of events, no matter the type (see Ap-
pendix A), suggests the credential is being used without human intervention. This
characteristic is considered a catch all, in case the narrower scoped characteristics
fail to identify excessive usage of a credential. For example, we do not have a char-
acteristic looking for excessive password resets or registration events.
Excessive Number of Authentication Events
As described in §5.1.2, on average a typical user may authenticate to one of the DSL
accepting applications once per month. Any credential with an excessive number of
authentications may indicate a credential is compromised and is being used by an
autonomous system.
Excessive Number of IP Addresses
In order to hide their activity and avoid detection, criminal enterprises frequently use
a collection of proxy servers to carry out their attacks. According to Geer, “Attackers
either can use their own computers to send bots and commands to victims or can
use a machine they have infected, which then acts as a proxy server. These proxy
servers can make finding the hacker difficult for security investigators" [35]. While
it is normal for an average person to have several IPs accessing their credential, an
excessive amount indicates criminal activity.
Excessive Number of Countries
Due to the fact the DSL population is comprised of DOD members and their fami-
lies, there is a greater likelihood of a person accessing an application from overseas.
Therefore, this characteristic is not designed to flag credentials accessing from over-
seas, but rather it is designed to flag credentials accessing from multiple countries.
Once again this is a strategy for criminal enterprises to hide the location of their
network traffic.
Excessive Number of Remote Proofing Failure Events
In order to obtain a NIST level two credential the DSL system employs a knowledge
based identity verification system. This system asks a series of questions that are
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very difficult to answer unless you are truly the individual. Any credential with an
excessive number of remote proofing failures is an indication an attacker attempted
to break the remote proofing process and compromise the credential.
Events from an IP that has a Poor Reputation
IP addresses accrue a reputation based on the activity that occurs at that address.
Consequently, should any credential have an excessive number of events from an
IP address with a negative reputation (e.g., Unsolicited, Snowshoe, or Trap) it is an
indication the credential is compromised (see Table 2.1)
Events from Malicious Countries
If an event contains an IP that is geo-located to a country that is known to be a hot
bed for criminal activity and/or is not an ally to the U.S. it may indicate the creden-
tial is compromised. Our baseline set of countries consider “malicious” is obtained
from a Bloomberg 2013 article detailing the list of “Top 10 Hacking Countries” [36].
From this list we removed the U.S. and added Iran and North Korea for obvious











11. North Korea (KP)
Periodicity of Authentication Events
People establish patterns in their daily lives. For example, most of us eat dinner at
or around the same time every night. If we were to record these events and when
they occurred over a period of time these patterns are easily identified. Using this
same process, it is possible identify patterns of usage within a system and ultimately
distinguish between a human or a machine. As a result, if an attacker has scripted the
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use of a DSL credential to occur everyday at the exact same time these patterns are
discoverable.
By calculating the Shannon Entropy [37] of a profile’s authentication events we can
identify those profiles that exhibit periodicity. We calculate the Shannon Entropy as
part of this thesis using two different methods in order to identify all of the patterns
within the system. To ensure enough data points exist to allow for randomness, both
methods limit the profiles used in this characteristic to those with 100 or more au-
thentication events.
In our first method, we calculate the entropy by ordering all authentication events by
the time they occurred. Then we calculate the deltas in time between each event. We
then input the delta values into our entropy calculation. With this method if a profile
exhibits low entropy, or randomness, it is an indication the corresponding credential
is potentially compromised.
Our second method, is very similar to our first, in the fact that we are only looking at
the time each authentication event occurred. With this method, we extract the hour
of the day (0 - 24) the event occurred. These values are then input into our entropy
calculation, and any profile with a really low or high entropy is an indication the
corresponding credential is potentially compromised.
4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Each of the eight characteristics discussed above in §4.2.1, produce a set of potentially
compromised credentials. To find these sets, we use descriptive statistics to analyze the
distribution of values for a characteristic across all profiles.
We calculate the minimum and maximum values to find the boundaries of our distribution
and the mean, median and standard deviation values to describe the distribution. We also
calculate the skewness and kurtosis to paint a general picture of the distribution. A positive
skewness value, as shown in Figure 4.2.2, indicates the distribution tail falls to the right,
where a negative skewness, also shown in Figure 4.2.2, indicates the tail falls to the left.
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Positive SkewNegative Skew
Figure 4.2: General Description of Skewness, from [1]
Similar to skewness, the kurtosis value describes the shape of the peak for a distribution.
Generally a positive value indicates a majority of the values fall around the mean and the
potential exists for a very long tail or extreme values. The descriptive statistics for each
characteristic can be seen in the analysis Chapter 5.
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After carefully establishing our infrastructure in §4.1.1 and indexing the artifacts provided
by DMDC in §4.1.2, we implement the strategy discussed in §4.2, and commence our
analysis to find potentially compromised credentials.
5.1 Results
Each of the eight characteristics (from §4.2.1) identify a set of potentially compromised
credentials. We then combine these sets to produce a distinct set of profiles. Each pro-
file correlates to a specific credential (see §3.1). We assign each profile a score based on
weighted characteristic matches flagged for that profile. For example, if we flag profile
12345 for exhibiting an excessive number of events, and an excessive number of distinct
IPs, it receives a score of two. Using this methodology we order the complete profile set
by the score where profiles having the highest score have an increased likelihood of being
compromised. The final results of our analysis are summarized in Chapter 7.
5.1.1 Excessive Number of Events
Out of the roughly 3.7 million profiles within the system, over the course of a year (see
§3.1) the average profile contains 13 events. This value is significantly greater than the
median value of 6 events, which indicates our distribution is tailed and contains statistical
outliers that we want to find. We consider the 18,439 profiles within the top 0.5 percentile
of the profiles with the most events to have an “Excessive” number of events. In fact,
one credential has almost 34,000 events and is therefore an interesting candidate for fur-
ther exploration, including ground truth. Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1.1 provide a complete
description of our results for this characteristic.
Table 5.1: Excessive Number of Events Descriptive Statis-
tics
Statistic Value
Number of Profiles 3,687,780
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Minimum Number of Events 1.0
Maximum Number of Events 33,993.0
Mean Number of Events 13.68
Standard Deviation 47.66
Median Number of Events 6.0
Skewness 188.76
Kurtosis 102,410.73
Number of Profiles over the estimate of realistic (1,000.0) 450.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 1 pct 37,183.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.5 pct 18,439.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.2 pct 7,382.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.1 pct 3,697.0
Figure 5.1: CDF of Profiles with Excessive Number of Events
5.1.2 Excessive Number of Authentication Events
Over the course of a year, each user on average authenticates once per month or 12 times
a year. Interestingly, we discovered roughly 6,800 profiles authenticate on average at least
once per day for a total of 365 authentications. This significantly breaks our a priori ex-
pectations of normal usage. In total, we find 15,643 profiles in the top 0.5 percentile and
consider these to have “Excessive” authentication events. Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1.2 pro-
vide a complete description of our results for this characteristic.
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Table 5.2: Excessive Number of Authentication Events De-
scriptive Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of Profiles 3,115,280
Minimum Number of Events 1.0
Maximum Number of Events 33,989.0
Mean Number of Events 12.19
Standard Deviation 50.72
Median Number of Events 4.0
Skewness 185.15
Kurtosis 94,518.10
Number of Profiles over the estimate of realistic (365.0) 6796.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 1 pct 31,181.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.5 pct 15,643.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.2 pct 6,259.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.1 pct 3,129.0
Figure 5.2: CDF of Profiles with Excessive Number of Authentication Events
5.1.3 Excessive Number of IPs Addresses
Out of the roughly 3.7 million profiles within the system, the average profile contains three
different IP addresses. Over 120,000 profiles contain ten or more different IP addresses,
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and the most extreme outlying profile has over 591 distinct IP addresses. There were 18,747
profiles in the top 0.5 percentile, which we consider “Excessive.” Table 5.3 and Figure 5.1.3
provide a complete description of our results for this characteristic.
Table 5.3: Excessive Number of IP Addresses Descriptive
Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of Profiles 3,687,780
Minimum Number of IPs 1.0
Maximum Number of IPs 591.0
Mean Number of IPs 3.04
Standard Deviation 6.47
Median Number of IPs 2.0
Skewness 17.62
Kurtosis 586.61
Number of Profiles over the estimate of realistic (10.0) 122033.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 1 pct 40,054.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.5 pct 18,747.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.2 pct 7,414.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.1 pct 3,768.0
Figure 5.3: CDF of Profiles and Distinct IP Count
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5.1.4 Excessive Number of Countries
The events with a geo-location (§3.1.1 discusses this and other shortcomings) show the
average profile comes from a single country. With this particular characteristic, the top
0.5 percentile contains 50,882 profiles, which is interesting because, it is a number that is
significantly greater than any other characteristic. More than likely it is the result of the fact
that some of the DSL credential holders are in the DOD and often travel or live in foreign
countries. Out of the 50,882 profiles only 496 exceeded our realistic estimate of three.
Even though a majority of the profiles in the top 0.5 percentile fall below our estimate of
realistic we are still going to flag them as “excessive” because, we use the top 0.5 percentile
for the other characteristics. Table 5.4 and Figure 5.1.4 provide a complete description of
our results for this characteristic.
Table 5.4: Excessive Number of Countries Descriptive
Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of Profiles 3,314,646
Minimum Number of Countries 1.0
Maximum Number of Countries 35.0
Mean Number of Countries 1.02
Standard Deviation 0.14
Median Number of Countries 1.0
Skewness 15.59
Kurtosis 1,412.59
Number of Profiles over the estimate of realistic (3.0) 496.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 1 pct 50,882.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.5 pct 50,882.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.2 pct 50,882.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.1 pct 50,882.0
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Figure 5.4: CDF of Profiles and Distinct Country Count
5.1.5 Excessive Number of Remote Proofing Failure Events
On average, users who fail a remote proofing, fail 1.8 times over a course of a year. Over
24,000 users fail the process more than six times, which exceeds our estimate of realistic.
This results in 4,800 profiles in the top 0.5 percentile that we flag as “excessive.” Table 5.5
and Figure 5.1.5 provide a complete description of our results for this characteristic.
Users who attempt to complete the process, but are never successful, may indicate an at-
tacker is attempting to brute force their way through the remote proofing process. Fu-
ture work, may want to investigate profiles with an excessive number of failures, but are
eventually successful as a separate characteristic. This new characteristic would identify
compromised credentials with a NIST level two identity proofing assurance.
Table 5.5: Excessive Number of Remote Proofing Failure
Events Descriptive Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of Profiles 766,777
Minimum Number of Events 1.0
Maximum Number of Events 338.0
Mean Number of Events 1.88
Standard Deviation 2.06




Number of Profiles over the estimate of realistic (6.0) 24,015.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 1 pct 8,329.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.5 pct 4,798.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.2 pct 1,941.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.1 pct 888.0
Figure 5.5: CDF of Profiles with Remote Proofing Failure Events
5.1.6 Events from an IP that has a Poor Reputation
The known abusive behaviors of compromised hosts include spam, attacks, and fraud. We
therefore, investigate whether the set of IP addresses accessing a credential are known by
external IP reputation systems. For example, a host that has sent an abusive email in the
past may be a likely candidate to be used for other nefarious purposes. Unfortunately, the
IP reputation data available to us for this thesis post dates the access events in our database.
Therefore, due to the nature of the Internet and the shifting ownership of IP addresses only
the top 0.5 percentile shall be considered. Of the 40,293 profiles containing events from an
IP with a poor reputation only 203 are in the top 0.5 percentile. Table 5.6 and Figure 5.1.6
provide a complete description of our results for this characteristic.
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Table 5.6: Events having Poor IP Reputation Descriptive
Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of Profiles 40,293
Minimum Number of Events 1.0
Maximum Number of Events 1,138.0
Mean Number of Events 5.39
Standard Deviation 15.35
Median Number of Events 2.0
Skewness 23.04
Kurtosis 1,054.77
Number of Profiles over the estimate of realistic (3.0) 14,671.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 1 pct 411.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.5 pct 203.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.2 pct 81.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.1 pct 42.0
Figure 5.6: CDF of Profiles with Events having Poor IP Reputation
5.1.7 Events from Malicious Countries
Of the roughly 3.7 million profiles, only 4,469 are accessed from IP addresses that reside
in a malicious country. One possible explanation for traffic originating from malicious
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countries is the relative ease with which both legitimate and attacking users can mask their
true geo-location behind a proxy server (see [35]). The end result is that only 23 profiles fall
in the top 0.5 percentile to be flagged for additional investigation. Table 5.7 and Figure 5.1.7
provide a complete description of our results for this characteristic.
Table 5.7: Events from Malicious Countries Descriptive
Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of Profiles 4,469
Minimum Number of Events 1.0
Maximum Number of Events 372.0
Mean Number of Events 6.97
Standard Deviation 15.85
Median Number of Events 3.0
Skewness 10.68
Kurtosis 163.55
Number of Profiles over the estimate of realistic (10.0) 633.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 1 pct 46.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.5 pct 23.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.2 pct 9.0
Number of Profiles in the Top 0.1 pct 5.0
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Figure 5.7: CDF of Profiles with Events from Malicious Countries
5.1.8 Periodicity of Authentication Events
As discussed in 4.2.1 we limit the number profiles when looking for periodicity to only
those containing 100 or more authentication events. The effect of this decision allows us
to focus on only 61,417 profiles when computing the entropy using both methods also
described in 4.2.1.
With our first method, the delta approach, we discover 181 profiles with an entropy between
0 and 1. This characteristic is different than the seven others previously discussed because,
in this case we are looking for the results with low entropy at the bottom of the result set.
Consequently, there were 303 profiles in the bottom 0.5 pct that shall be flagged for further
investigation. Table 5.8 and Figure 5.1.8 provide a complete description of our results for
this method.
Table 5.8: Periodicity of Authentication Events Statistics
Statistic Value









Number of Profiles in the Bottom 1 pct 614
Number of Profiles in the Bottom 0.5 pct 307
Number of Profiles in the Bottom 0.2 pct 123
Number of Profiles in the Bottom 0.1 pct 61
Figure 5.8: Histogram for Periodicity of Authentication Events
Our second method, the 24 hour bin approach, we only discover 98 profiles with an en-
tropy between 0 and 1, however, with this method both low and high entropy values are
important. A high entropy indicates authentications occurred at the exact same time of
day. Consequently, we found 234 profiles with an entropy between 4.48 and 4.58, which is
the max value possible. Table 5.9 and Figure 5.1.8 provides a complete description of our
results for this method.
Table 5.9: Periodicity of Authentication Events with 24 Hour
Bins Statistics
Statistic Value









Number of Profiles in the Bottom 1 pct 614
Number of Profiles in the Bottom 0.5 pct 307
Number of Profiles in the Bottom 0.2 pct 123
Number of Profiles in the Bottom 0.1 pct 61




To further investigate outliers identified in the preceding analysis, DMDC, the owner of
the DSL system, agreed to contact the owners of credentials flagged as suspicious. DMDC
maintained SOP when contacting individuals for further information. In an effort to main-
tain anonymity, credentials owners shall be referred to as profile “one,” “two,” and “three.”
6.1 Profile One
As one of the 28 profiles having five out of the eight characteristics (see Table 7.1), obtain-
ing ground truth for profile one is important. Upon contacting profile one, DMDC intro-
duced themselves and verbally authenticated the individual’s identity. DMDC proceeded
to explain why they were contacting the individual and began to inquire if they have ever
traveled to any of the countries associated with the activity seen in their DSL credential
event logs (see Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1: Geo Locations of Profile One Events (Produced by Kibana)
The individual responded they never visited these countries. However, profile one had an
explanation for the unusual activity. The individual expressed a strong concern for Internet
privacy, and, as a result, how they conduct all business using the Tails operating system.
The Tails website states, “Tails is a live operating system, that you can start on almost
any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card. It aims at preserving your privacy
and anonymity” [38]. Tails achieves this by requiring all Internet connections go through
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the anonymizing Tor network. Originally announced in 2002, by Roger Dingledine, Nick
Mathewson, and Paul Syverson and described in [39], Tor allows users to conceal their
identity and hide their activity by encrypting packets and routing them through a series of
Tor nodes hosted across the globe.
Understanding how profile one uses the DSL credential and accesses the Internet, explains
most of the characteristics associated with their credential. While this is not an instance
of fraud, waste or abuse, it does validate that our work is able to successfully identify
credentials that are being used by individuals trying to hide their activity.
6.2 Profile Two
Profile two exhibits several characteristics of interest: excessive number of events, exces-
sive number of authentication events, and high periodicity of authentication events. As
shown in Figure 6.2, profile two over the course of a year has accumulated over 23,000
authentication events and has an entropy of 0.0033, which is low when compared to other
profiles and is suggestive of an automated system performing authentications with this cre-
dential.
Figure 6.2: Authentication Events for Profile Two (Produced by Kibana)
After further research, prior to contacting this individual, DMDC discovered these authen-
tications are attributable to an individual performing system load testing from a DMDC
partner (see Appendix C) data center. While such load testing goes against DMDC policy,
it does prove we are able to identify credentials used by an automated system.
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6.3 Profile Three
Flagged due to failing an excessive number of remote proofing failures (see Figure 6.3,
and exhibiting periodicity for authentication events, profile three was contacted by DMDC
in an effort to find the ground truth. Upon contacting the individual, authenticating their
identity, and explaining the situation the individual advised DMDC all authentications are
legitimate.
Figure 6.3: Remote Proofing Events for Profile Three (Produced by Kibana)
As a veteran of the U.S. military, they stated they have Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD), Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), anxiety, they are neurotic, and
have memory issues. They engage in repetitive behaviors. As a result, they make frequent
updates to their records because they are anxious about their information changing. They
also check for any changes, new features, updates to their claim status, etc.. Their memory
issues led them to not answer quiz questions correctly and they frequently forget their
password.
The response provided by this individual, explains the associated characteristics for this
credential. It is also a reality check of how hard it is to simply identify potentially compro-
mised credentials based solely on a few characteristics when each human is so unique.
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In this thesis, we posit that potentially compromised credentials are detectable by analyzing
the system artifacts of a large-scale production, single-signon system. With permission
from DMDC, and access to the DSL system artifacts, we parsed, stored, indexed, and
analyzed the event logs representing the actions taken by roughly 3.5 million credentials
between January 2013 to January 2014.
We pursued a strategy that identified eight characteristics compromised credentials may
possess (see §4.2.1). We then used statistical analysis and a narrowing threshold (e.g., top
1.0 percentile, top 0.5 percentile etc.) to focus our results on the most extreme cases within
each characteristic. Finally, we combined the results from each characteristic to produce a
weighted set of potentially compromised credentials for each threshold category. Table 7.1
summarizes our results by showing the breakdown between the number of credentials and
the number of characteristics they hold, within each threshold category. While Figure 7
illustrates how the number of credentials identified is reduced by narrowing the threshold
used to flag an outlying credential.
Table 7.1: Weighted Compromised Credentials
No. of Characteristics Top 1.0% Top 0.5% Top 0.2% Top 0.1%
1 80,818 67,045 57,885 54,417
2 20,400 11,234 4,897 2,577
3 13,740 5,792 1,924 895
4 1,601 613 191 76
5 96 28 5 1
Total 116,656 84,712 64,902 57,966
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Figure 7.1: Weighted Compromised Credentials
We recognize the fact that our results contain both false negatives and false positives, as
seen in our ground truth analysis (see Chapter 6). We also recognize, that we have not
identified all compromised credentials within the DSL system. For example, there are
many known instances reported to DMDC support centers of ex-spouses compromising
credentials because, they are able to successfully complete the remote proofing process
for their ex-partners. Our strategy (see §4.2), is not designed to flag profiles with these
types of normal usage patterns. Therefore, credentials compromised in this manner are not
identified by our research.
Having said that, our research has produced very valuable results for the DOD and DMDC.
Take for example the top 0.5 percentile threshold, where we discovered 84,712, highly sus-
picious, potentially compromised credentials. Within this set, we identified 641 credentials
that have four or more characteristics. It is our recommendation, that DMDC take imme-
diate action to ensure the rightful owners are in control of these credentials. We recognize
there is a cost, time and / or money, associated with completing this task. Therefore, we
minimally recommend these credential holders be forced to reproof their identity and / or
have the DMDC support center send an email to notify these individuals of the suspicious
activity associated with their credential.
In conclusion, it is our belief the most valuable aspect of our research is the repeatable
process we have developed. If this process is further refined, over time it has the potential
to accurately and in real-time identify compromised credentials. Pursuing this effort along
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with additional security enhancements, such as multiple factors of authentication, shall
significantly increase the security footprint of the DSL credential. It is our hope, the DOD
and DMDC continue to pursue this research to ensure the viability and sustainability of the
DSL system.
7.1 Future Work
To improve the quality and quantity of credentials flagged as compromised, an in depth
analysis evaluating the precision and recall of our approach is required. To accomplish this
task, the DMDC support center could be used to determine if all credentials identified are
truly compromised. As discussed above and as seen in our ground truth investigation (see
Chapter 6), there is a cost associated with completing this analysis using this technique.
However, this effort is required in order to increase the accuracy of credentials flagged as
compromised.
In addition to this analysis, future work must develop additional characteristics in order to
increase the accuracy of our approach. Taking our results as an example, of the 84,712
credentials we flag as compromised in the top 0.5 percentile, 641 are considered highly
suspicious since they possess at least four of the eight characteristics. With additional
characteristics, we can achieve greater accuracy and reduce the number of highly suspicious
credentials. This assumes each additional characteristic is justifiable with sound logic. For
example, of the 641 credentials identified as highly suspicious, how many are currently
receiving some form of financial benefit from the U.S. government? Or, how many of
these credentials are associated with deceased individuals not reported to the DOD? Using
additional data sources and some level of creativity, increasing the accuracy of credentials
flagged as highly suspicious is easily within the realm of possible.
Our research is reactive since we analyze the data long after the events actually occurred.
Future work may easily address this issue and become more proactive by obtaining a live
data feed of events from the DSL system that are piped into Elasticsearch. At that point, a
Kibana dashboard could easily be developed to flag compromised credentials in real-time.
Having the ability to detect compromised credentials in real-time is critical to prevent future
criminal enterprises or individual scam artists from executing large scale attacks against the
DSL system.
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Our approach to using statistical analysis is not unique, however, we apply it to a new
problem domain and believe the general approach is under-utilized and is readily applicable
to other problem spaces. For example, a significant number of failed CAC authentications
at a physical DOD location may indicate an individual attempting to gain illegal access to a
facility. Or a physician, with an excessive number of claims may be an indication of fraud
within the DOD or DVA healthcare system. These and other problem domains shall be left




Table A.1: Table of Event Types tracked by the DSLs system
Code Event Summary
1 REGISTRATION
A new credential is registered and
associated with an identity
2 ACTIVATION
A new credential is activated for use
within the system.
3 DEACTIVATION
A credential has been deactivated
and can no longer be used.
4 UPGRADE
The identity associated with a cre-
dential has been proof to a higher
NIST level of assurance.
5 MAIL_SENT
A credential activation letter has
been sent via United States Postal
Service (USPS).
6 MAIL_RETURNED
A credential activation letter has
been returned via USPS.
7 AUTHENTICATION
A successful authentication has oc-
curred for the associated credential.
8 SURROGATE_ACCESS
A surrogate has accessed the cre-
dential owner’s information.
9 USERNAME_RETRIEVED
The user name associated with the
credential has been retrieved.
10 PASSWORD_RESET
The password associated with the
credential has been reset.
11 CHALLENGE_QUESTIONS_RESET
The challenge questions associated
with the credential have been reset.
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12 PERSONAL_IMAGE_RESET
The security image used during au-
thentication has been reset.
13 DEVICE_ACTIVATION
A second factor device has been
registered / activated for use with
the credential.
14 DEVICE_DEACTIVATION
A second factor device has been de-
registered / deactivated for use with
the credential.
15 RELATIONSHIP_ESTABLISHED
A surrogate relationship has been
established.
16 PERMISSION_GRANTED
A new permission has been granted
to a surrogate relationship.
17 PERMISSION_DENIED
A permission has been removed
from a surrogate relationship.
18 PERSON_PULLED
An operator has requested to view
the credential owner’s information.
19 PERSON_ADDED
An operator has added a new person
to the repository
20 PROFILE
A profile is created that represents
a person’s identity within the DSL
system.
21 REMOTE_PROOFING_ATTEMPT
An attempt to remote proof a per-
son’s identity to increase the NIST
level assurance has occurred.
22 REMOTE_PROOFING_SUCCESS
An attempt to remote proof a per-
son’s identity to increase the NIST
level assurance was successful.
23 REMOTE_PROOFING_FAILURE
An attempt to remote proof a per-
son’s identity to increase the NIST
level assurance has failed.
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24 REMOTE_PROOFING_DISCOVERY_FAILURE
The remote proofing vendor failed
to find a person’s identity with the
information provided.
25 REMOTE_PROOFING_VELOCITY_FAILURE
The remote proofing vendor failed
to proof a person’s identity due to
too many successive failures.
26 REMOTE_PROOFING_VERIFICATION_FAILURE
The remote proofing vendor found
a person’s identity however, the in-
formation provided failed to satisfy
the verification requirements.
27 REMOTE_PROOFING_QUIZ_FAILURE
The attempt to answer the remote
proofing quiz failed.
28 REVOCATION The credential has been revoked.
29 EMAIL_SENT
A digitally signed email has been
sent to the credential owner’s reg-
istered email address.
30 USERNAME_CHANGED
The user name associated with the
credential has been change to the
DOD Enterprise User Name.
31 REMOTE_PROOFING_CONSENT
A user has granted consent to re-
motely proof an identity.
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# Download and install Java 1.7 JDK
rpm --install [JDK FILE]
# Elasticsearch is stored on the encrypted partition
cd /mnt/drobo/dmdc_encrypted/





ln -s elasticsearch-1.1.0/ latest
cd latest








ln -s /mnt/drobo/dmdc_encrypted/elasticsearch/kibana-3.0.0 _site




# Set Owners and Permissions
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chown -R elasticsearch:dmdc /mnt/drobo/dmdc_encrypted/elasticsearch
chmod -R 744 /mnt/drobo/dmdc_encrypted/elasticsearch
# Start Elasticsearch as the elasticsearch user
./bin/elasticsearch -Xmx4g -Xms3g -d
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APPENDIX C:
Applications Accepting DS Logon
1. eBenefits
2. TRICARE Online (TOL)
3. milConnect
4. DS LOGON Self-Service website
5. Beneficiary Web Enrollment (BWE)
6. Address Update
7. Family Subsistence Supplemental Allowance (FSSA)
8. Joint Qualification System (JQS)
9. RAPIDS Self Service (RSS)
10. Transition GPS
11. DMDC Reserve Component Purchased TRICARE Application (RCPTA)
12. Verification of Military Experience and Training (VMET)






19. DoD Spouse Education and Career Opportunities (SECO)
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